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ESSAY

THE PRUDENTIAL THIRD-PARTY STANDING
OF FAMILY-OWNED CORPORATIONS

M ATTHEW I. H ALL† & BENJAMIN M EANS††
INTRODUCTION
On November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court agreed to decide whether
for-proﬁt corporations or their shareholders have standing to challenge
federal regulations that implement the Patient Protection and Aﬀordable
Care Act (ACA).1 At issue in the two cases consolidated for appeal, Hobby
Lobby 2 and Conestoga Wood Specialties, 3 are regulations mandating that
employers with ﬁfty or more employees oﬀer health insurance that includes
coverage for all contraceptives approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).4 The plaintiﬀs assert that providing certain types of contraceptive
Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.
Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The authors would like to
thank Alex McDonald for excellent research assistance and Josie Brown, Nathan Chapman, Colin
Miller, Elizabeth Pollman, Eric Rasmusen, Bo Rutledge, Thomas Rutledge, and Howard
Wasserman for helpful comments.
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, ��� Stat. ��� (����) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of �� and
42 U.S.C.).
2 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013).
3 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (requiring coverage of women’s
preventive care provided for in the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA)
guidelines); Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, H EALTH R ESOURCES & S ERVICES A DMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (mandating coverage of “[a]ll
Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and
patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity”). Over ninety
challenges to the mandate have been ﬁled, approximately half by for-proﬁt corporations and half
†
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care would be contrary to their religious beliefs and allege, therefore, that
the mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA)5 as well as the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.6
The government does not dispute that the family owners of Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties are sincere in their religious
objections.7 However, the mandate applies only to employers and imposes
no direct duties upon corporate shareholders.8 Thus, a threshold issue in
these cases and dozens of other pending cases involving for-proﬁt corporations is whether any plaintiﬀ has standing to challenge the mandate.9 Some
courts have concluded that religious objections to the mandate are simply
nonjusticiable.10 Other courts have found standing, either by endorsing the
novel proposition that a for-proﬁt business corporation is, itself, a person
capable of religious exercise,11 or by allowing individual owners who have no
personal obligations or liability under the ACA’s mandate to nevertheless
interpose a religious objection.12
As even a quick summary of the existing circuit split reveals, resolution
of the issues of ﬁrst impression presented by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood Specialties would require the Court to engage diﬃcult questions at the
intersection of religious faith and the corporate form.13 The Court’s task is
by nonproﬁts. HHS Mandate Information Central, B ECKET F UND, http://www.becketfund.org/
hhsinformationcentral (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
5 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (providing that the federal government may not substantially burden religious
exercise without a compelling justiﬁcation, even if the burden results from the application of a
facially neutral law).
6 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1120-21.
7 See Brief for Respondents at 15, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 678 (No. 13-354), 2013 WL 5720377.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4); see also Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 624 (6th
Cir. ����) (noting that “[t]he corporate form oﬀers several advantages,” including “limitation of
liability” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
9 Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to disputes
that are concrete enough to present a “case[]” or “controvers[y].” U.S. C ONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10 See, e.g., Autocam, 730 F.3d at 620; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
11 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1126, 1128-29.
12 See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1210, 1216-18
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
13 For a thorough analysis and thoughtful commentary on the merits issues, see Eugene
Volokh, Archive: Hobby Lobby, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://www.volokh.com/category/hobbylobby/ (last updated Dec. 11, 2013, 5:56 PM). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil
Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 G REEN B AG 2D 235, 237
(2013) (arguing that “the law of veil piercing provides the analytical framework currently missing”
from the decisions addressing the mandate); Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The
Business Entity Law Response to Challenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 W M. & M ARY
B US. L. R EV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 26-56), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
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made more challenging by two background features of the legal landscape.
First, although the Court has long held that corporations are legal persons
and possess certain constitutional rights, the Court has never adopted a
uniﬁed theory of corporate constitutional rights and has preferred to
consider each issue on its own merits.14 Thus, the Court must consider the
question of free exercise (whether framed as a constitutional or statutory
analysis) without the beneﬁt of clear principles to guide its analysis, and
with limited institutional competence in matters of corporate governance.
Second, any holding the Court might render regarding individual or
corporate standing would necessarily rest upon features of state corporate
law. Because corporations are creatures of state law, the scope of the
corporate charter as well as the governance rules that deﬁne the respective
roles of shareholders, directors, and oﬃcers are determined by state, not
federal law.15 For example, the salience of the fact that the cases before the
Court involve closely held, family-owned corporations depends upon the
extent to which a jurisdiction recognizes special rules for close corporations,
including the ﬂexibility to tailor the corporate contract to suit the investors’
objectives.16
We oﬀer a much simpler alternative: under well-established exceptions
to the prudential rule against third-party standing, one party can sometimes
assert the interests of a third party.17 Allowing Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
id=2294582; Dahlia Lithwick, Corporations Are People, the Biblical Sequel, S LATE (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/supreme_court_and_obamacare_
contraception_mandate_are_companies_persons.html.
14 See, e.g., Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed
Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 L OY. U. C HI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr.,
The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation
After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 G EO. L.J. 1347, 1348 (1979); Elizabeth Pollman,
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 4 U TAH L. R EV. 1629, 1631-63 (2011).
15 See S TEPHEN M. B AINBRIDGE , C ORPORATION L AW AND E CONOMICS 14 (2002).
16 Generalizations in this area are especially diﬃcult because some jurisdictions take an
expansive view of the ﬁduciary obligations owed among shareholders while others emphasize the
importance of speciﬁc, contractual bargaining to protect minority interests. Compare Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (Mass. 1976) (holding that the majority
shareholders of a close corporation owe a ﬁduciary “duty of utmost good faith and loyalty”), with
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (“The tools of good corporate practice are
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection
before parting with consideration.”).
17 As a general matter, litigants may advance only their own claims. See Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, ��� (����) (“[E]ven when the plaintiﬀ has alleged injury suﬃcient to meet the ‘case or
controversy’ requirement, this Court has held that the plaintiﬀ generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties.” (citing Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943))). But the Court has articulated exceptions
to this rule that ﬁt the circumstances of the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga cases. See, e.g., Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (holding that a reproductive rights advocate had standing to
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Wood Specialties to litigate religious objections to the mandate on behalf of
their shareholders obviates the need for the Court to venture into uncharted
territory.18 The crucial insight is that the corporation’s injury need not be
religious in nature for the religious objections to the ACA regulations to be
adjudicated. So long as the corporate plaintiﬀ is injured economically by the
regulations, it has standing under Article III to challenge them. At that point,
the corporation’s assertion of the constitutional or statutory rights of absent
third parties is properly analyzed under the rubric of third-party standing.19
Below, we ﬁrst defend our claim that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
Specialties present near-perfect examples of a situation in which prudential
third-party standing would be appropriate.20 As family-owned businesses,
the corporations are “extension[s] of family relationships,”21 and there is
every reason to expect that the corporations will serve as eﬀective advocates
for their owners. Moreover, unless the corporations can object on behalf of
their shareholders, the shareholders may be “denied a forum in which to
assert their own rights.”22
“assert the rights of unmarried persons denied access to contraceptives”); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (granting third-party standing where “it would be diﬃcult if not impossible
for the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court”).
18 In analogous circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has used third-party standing doctrine to
avoid unnecessary questions of ﬁrst impression. In EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing
Co., the court observed,
Townley [the corporation] urges this court to hold that it is entitled to invoke the
Free Exercise Clause on its own behalf. Because Townley is merely the instrument
through and by which Mr. and Mrs. Townley express their religious beliefs, it is
unnecessary to address the abstract issue whether a for proﬁt corporation has rights
under the Free Exercise Clause independent of those of its shareholders and oﬃcers.
859 F.2d 610, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court’s institutional role is broader, and the circuit split
concerns the very issues the Ninth Circuit declined to decide, but we argue that the Ninth Circuit’s
cautious approach provides better guidance for the Court than any of the decisions below.
19 For a related approach, see Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. R EV. 1, 26-28 (2013), which argues that the
corporation should have associational standing to assert uniﬁed shareholder interests because the
corporation’s interests are not distinct from those of its shareholders. Our argument, however,
does not require a ﬁnding that shareholder interests ﬂow through the corporation. Thus, our
proposal does not call for a special approach to third-party standing in the corporate context.
20 Although beyond the scope of our present argument, we note that one commentator oﬀers
third-party standing as the best approach to a wide range of constitutional questions involving
corporations. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations 40-60 (Va. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2013-33, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/id=2330972.
21 Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 W M . & M ARY L. R EV . 1185,
1194 (2013).
22 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446. Of course, asserting a right is not the same as establishing
it. The point, rather, is that impediments to standing are not dispositive of, or necessarily even
relevant to, the underlying merits.
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Second, if the badly fractured decisions below do not already serve as a
cautionary tale, we elaborate the diﬃculties the Court would encounter
were it to accept the parties’ invitation to wade into the morass of deﬁning
corporate constitutional rights. The inquiry is daunting because it involves
application of an imperfectly deﬁned right of free exercise to an imperfectly
deﬁned subject. Corporations are legal persons deﬁned by state statutes,
and while they enjoy certain constitutional rights, 23 the Court has not
previously adopted an overarching theory that explains when corporations
can assert rights and when they cannot.24 The Court is at a disadvantage in
addressing these questions as it lacks any particular expertise in matters of
state corporate law. Put bluntly, we oﬀer the Court a way to resolve the
cases before it that, unlike the approaches advocated by the parties, avoids
the need to decide questions of ﬁrst impression regarding the free exercise
rights of for-proﬁt corporations.
I. T HE C ASE FOR T HIRD-PARTY STANDING
Ordinarily, litigants may not assert the rights of third parties.25 However,
the Court has crafted an exception for cases like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga,
in which the litigant seeks to assert the rights of related nonparties who face
obstacles that prevent them from asserting those rights directly. 26 As
summarized in a leading treatise, “third-party standing requires three
elements: an injury in fact to a party, a close relationship to the nonparty
whose rights are asserted, and some signiﬁcant obstacle that impedes the
nonparty’s assertion of his own rights.”27 We address each element in turn.
A. Injury in Fact
Corporations that defy the ACA mandate are subject to penalties that
satisfy the constitutional requirement of concrete injury. The ACA requires
corporations to provide insurance coverage that includes “preventive care
23
24

See Willis, supra note 19, at 35-36; see also Garrett, supra note 20, at 15-40.
Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 n.72 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptualized as a grantee of a state concession, a nexus of . . . contracts, . . . or any other recognized
model.” (citations omitted)); Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free
Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 C ASE W. R ES. L. R EV. 497, 501-06 (2011)
(highlighting the importance of fundamental corporate theory for constitutional analysis of
corporate rights).
25 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
26 See supra note 17.
27 13A C HARLES A LAN W RIGHT , A RTHUR R. M ILLER & E DWARD H. C OOPER , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 3531.9.3, at 737 (3d ed. 2008).
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and screenings” for women as speciﬁed in guidelines set by the Health
Resources and Services Administration.28 Those guidelines require coverage
of “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women
with reproductive capacity.” 29 Failure to abide by the mandate triggers
“immediate tax penalties, potential regulatory action, and possible private
lawsuits.”30 For Hobby Lobby, the tax penalties alone could total almost
$475 million per year.31 There is nothing abstract about a ﬁne.32
B. Close Relationship
In assessing third-party standing, the Court has required both a relationship between the litigant and the third party and a connection between that
relationship and the alleged constitutional injury. In the foundational 1925
case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters, for instance, two private schools successfully
challenged an Oregon state law requiring all children to attend public
schools.33 The plaintiﬀ schools (each, incidentally, a corporation, and one a
for-proﬁt corporation)34 alleged an economic injury on their own behalf,35
and also a violation of substantive due process on behalf of parents wishing
to send their children to private school.36 The Court permitted the litigant
corporations to assert the constitutional rights of the absent parents, ﬁnding
that the close relationship between them was tightly connected to the
alleged violation of the parents’ rights, and therefore justiﬁed permitting
the schools to assert those rights on the parents’ behalf.37
An even closer relationship exists in the cases involving closely held,
family-owned businesses now before the Court, which should more than

28
29

42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, H EALTH R ESOURCES & S ERVICES A DMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
30 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir.) (citing 26 U.S.C. §§
4980D, 4980H (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
31 See id. (noting that this ﬁgure assumes that the term “individual” in § 4980D(b)(1) refers
to each of the more than 13,000 individuals insured under Hobby Lobby’s plan).
32 See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-57 (1953) (holding that threat of “pocketbook
injury” to litigant was suﬃcient to create a case or controversy, and permitting litigant to assert
rights of absent third parties).
33 268 U.S. 510, 529-33, 535-36 (1925).
34 Id. at 531-33.
35 Id. at 531.
36 Id. at 536.
37 Id. at 534-36 (noting that the “unlawful interference” with the parents’ right to direct their
children’s education would lead to “the consequent destruction of [the litigant corporations’]
business and property”).
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suﬃce to establish a prudential basis for third-party standing. First, in all
corporations, the relationship between shareholders and corporation is not
one of arm’s-length commercial dealing, as between vendor and vendee.
Rather, when shareholders invest capital, they become equity owners and
the corporation has a ﬁduciary obligation to protect their interests.38 (By
contrast, the rights of other stakeholders are deﬁned mostly by contract.39)
Thus, even when control and ownership are separated, as in a typical public
corporation in which a centralized board of directors makes decisions on
behalf of passive investors, the interests of shareholders are central to the
corporate enterprise.40
Second, in close corporations like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
Specialties, the shareholders deﬁne the scope and objectives of the business
venture. As a practical matter, there is no separation of ownership and
control.41 Thus, it is undisputed and unsurprising that the family owners of
Hobby Lobby have been able to run the business “according to a set of
Christian principles.”42 In this regard, moreover, it is worth noting that family
businesses often reﬂect family value systems and are governed accordingly.43
C. Signiﬁcant Obstacles
Finally, the Court has limited prudential third-party standing to cases in
which the nonparties face a substantial obstacle to litigating their interests
38 F RANK H. E ASTERBROOK & D ANIEL R. F ISCHEL , T HE E CONOMIC S TRUCTURE OF
C ORPORATE L AW 90-91 (1991). The extent to which a corporation’s board must prioritize
shareholder interests in any particular case is debatable, but only to the extent board independence
from shareholders maximizes the long-term value of the enterprise for all participants, including
shareholders. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 V A. L. R EV. 247, 287-319 (1999) (arguing that directors serve the interests of the corporation—
“all the individuals who make ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments and agree to participate in the extracontractual, internal mediation process within the ﬁrm”—not just the shareholders).
39 E ASTERBROOK & F ISCHEL , supra note 38, at 90-91.
40 Even corporate law scholars who embrace the board’s independent power and take a dim
view of shareholder participation in management acknowledge that boards must produce value for
shareholders. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. R EV. 547, 550 (2003) (“[D]irector accountability for maximizing
shareholder wealth remains an important component of director primacy.”).
41 However, even if a corporation has only a single shareholder, the corporate entity retains a
distinct, legal existence. The rights and grievances of shareholders cannot be attributed to the
corporation itself. See Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 472, 477, 480 (2006)
(holding that alleged racial animus toward a corporation’s sole shareholder did not invest the
corporation with the right to bring a § 1981 claim).
42 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S.
Ct. 678 (2013).
43 See Means, supra note 21 (“Whether organized as partnerships, corporations, or LLCs, family
firms are economic institutions embedded in a context of family social roles and values.”).
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directly. As the Court has repeatedly recognized, a lack of Article III
standing may constitute just such an obstacle. In Barrows v. Jackson, for
instance, the Court allowed a white seller of property to defend a damages
action alleging breach of a racially restrictive covenant by invoking the
equal protection rights of nonwhite purchasers.44 The Court stated that,
because no claim was asserted against the African American buyers of the
property, “it would be diﬃcult if not impossible for the persons whose
rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court,” 45 and
concluded that “[t]he relation between the coercion exerted on respondent
[seller] and her possible pecuniary loss thereby is so close to the purpose of
the restrictive covenant, to violate the constitutional rights of those discriminated against, that respondent is the only eﬀective adversary of the unworthy
covenant in its last stand.”46
The Court again addressed the importance of obstacles to a nonparty’s
standing in Eisenstadt v. Baird, a case involving the distribution of contraceptives to an unmarried college student.47 The defendant, William Baird,
was charged with violating a criminal statute that prohibited distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried individuals. 48 The Court allowed Baird to
assert the equal protection rights of unmarried persons wishing to obtain
contraceptives, relying on the fact that the absent third parties, “unmarried
persons denied access to contraceptives in Massachusetts, . . . are not
themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, are denied a forum in
which to assert their own rights.”49
Similar obstacles to individual standing exist in the contraception mandate cases, in that the challenged regulations require the corporate defendants to provide coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptives but impose
no obligations or liabilities of any kind on the individual plaintiﬀs.50 Indeed,
the individual plaintiﬀs’ choice to organize their businesses as corporations
protects them from personal liability for the acts or omissions of the

44 346 U.S. 249, 251-52, 255-57 (1953). Barrows arose after Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), in which the Court held that racially restrictive covenants were not enforceable against
nonwhite purchasers. Barrows raised the question whether, notwithstanding Shelley, an action for
damages could be brought by a co-covenantor against a breaching co-covenantor. 346 U.S. at 251.
45 Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257.
46 Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
47 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972).
48 Id. at 440-41.
49 Id. at 446.
50 See Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 2013) (reasoning that the decision to comply with, and the consequences associated with the mandate fall solely upon the
corporation, not upon individual shareholders or oﬃcers).
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corporations.51 Thus, like the African American property buyers in Barrows,
or the unmarried contraceptive user in Eisenstadt, there are forceful arguments that the individual plaintiﬀs in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
Specialties lack a personal Article III injury.52 The Court has repeatedly held
that such standing concerns present a suﬃcient obstacle to permit thirdparty standing.53
In sum, the third-party standing doctrine provides a straightforward
answer to the threshold question of justiciability in Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga. In both cases, and in others still percolating in the lower courts, a
corporation that fails to oﬀer the required healthcare coverage faces direct
economic injury, but the religious owners whose constitutional interests are
ultimately at stake lack any obvious basis for standing because the mandate
does not apply to them. Therefore, the corporation may be “the only
eﬀective adversary” able to raise the religious objections of its controlling
shareholders. As in Eisenstadt and Barrows, the economic penalty faced by
the corporate litigants is closely intertwined with the religious interests of
the third-party shareholders. 54 Moreover, when shareholders have the
ability to control the corporation, as in a family-owned enterprise, the
required “close relationship”55 is present and there is every reason to believe
that the corporation will advocate eﬀectively for the owners’ religious
interests, if permitted to do so.

51 See E ASTERBROOK & F ISCHEL , supra note 38, at 11 (“‘Limited liability’ means only that
those who contribute equity capital to a ﬁrm risk no more than their initial investments . . . .”).
52 See Autocam, 730 F.3d at 624; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 386-88 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
53 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446 (noting the case for third-party standing was strengthened
by the fact that the statutory restriction on the sale of contraception did not apply to the potential
purchaser/users, such that the users would be “denied a forum in which to assert their own
rights”); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (granting standing where the suit in
question presented the “unique situation . . . in which it would be diﬃcult if not impossible for
the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court”). The D.C.
Circuit has recognized this dilemma and oﬀered a pragmatic, if question-begging, standing-bydefault argument: individual owners must have standing because the corporations do not, and
someone must have the ability to challenge the law. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The third-party standing doctrine oﬀers a more
grounded solution.
54 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445 (“[M]ore important than the nature of the relationship
between the litigant and those whose rights he seeks to assert is the impact of the litigation on the
third-party interests.”); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 259 (“The relation between the coercion exerted on
respondent and her possible pecuniary loss thereby is so close to the purpose of the restrictive
covenant, to violate the constitutional rights of those discriminated against, that respondent is the
only eﬀective adversary . . . .”).
55 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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II. T HE IMPLICATIONS OF STATE C ORPORATE LAW
In their response to the government’s petition for certiorari, the Hobby
Lobby plaintiﬀs contend that because the family owners are “unanimous in
their belief that the contraceptive-coverage requirement violates the
religious values they attempt to follow” in their business, the “case is an
ideal vehicle for addressing whether a for-proﬁt business and its owners can
exercise religion.”56 In fact, the shareholders’ united position only clariﬁes
that prudential third-party standing is the appropriate mode of analysis,
because there is no daylight between the corporation’s position and the
third parties whose interests would be protected.57 Only if the shareholders
were in disagreement about the religious values at stake would there be any
reason for the Court to question the corporation’s ability to represent the
shareholders’ interests and, perhaps, to reach the diﬃcult questions regarding separate corporate or individual standing.
Applying third-party standing analysis in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
Wood Specialties does leave important questions unanswered, but it is far
from clear that the Court will ever need to resolve them. There are no
circumstances in which controlling shareholders can prioritize their private
values, whether religious or otherwise, over the fundamental goal of producing value for all stockholders.58 For example, in a recent case involving a
conﬂict between a minority investor that wanted the corporation to monetize its market position and controlling shareholders who sought to provide
a community service and keep for-proﬁt activities to a minimum, the
Delaware Chancery Court held that “[t]he corporate form . . . is not an
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there
56 Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 20-21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The government agrees that the issue of standing is properly before the Court. See Brief for
the Petitioners at 26-31, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-354),
2014 WL 173486.
57 See EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 619-20 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining
to “address the abstract issue whether a for proﬁt corporation has rights under the Free Exercise
Clause independent of those of its shareholders and oﬃcers” because the closely held corporation
was “merely the instrument” through which its owners expressed their uniformly held religious
beliefs). In contrast, it is unlikely that a shareholder’s religious beliefs would be given any weight
in a public corporation. Given the diverse corporate congregation, the duty to maximize proﬁts
may be the only overarching tenet of the faith.
58 See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[T]he duty of loyalty
therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the
beneﬁt of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity with perpetual life in which
the residual claimants have locked in their investment.”); In re Novell, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A.
No. 6032-VCN, 2013 WL 322560, at *7 (Del Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (“There is no single path that a
board must follow in order to maximize stockholder value, but directors must follow a path of
reasonableness which leads toward that end.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment.”59 As the court further observed, “[i]f [the controlling shareholders]
were the only stockholders aﬀected by their decisions, then there would be
no one to object.”60 Thus, absent shareholder unanimity, the Court might
never need to decide the diﬃcult questions of ﬁrst impression regarding the
free exercise rights of for-proﬁt corporations.
To be clear, we assume that state corporate law will continue to require
unanimous approval for any fundamental departure from the basic proﬁtseeking function of the corporate form. 61 Under no circumstances can
shareholders waive a corporation’s responsibility to comply with existing
law; rather, the issue is whether the corporation can engage in costly
deﬁance in order to vindicate a purely religious interest without violating its
ﬁduciary obligation to its shareholders. Most corporate decisions involving
religion will fall within the protection of the business judgment rule, so long
as the controlling shareholders can articulate a long-term business interest
served—for instance, building a brand identity, earning customer loyalty,
and the like. 62 However, to the extent corporate law goes further and
permits a corporation to assert a supervening religious interest, even absent
shareholder unanimity, the scope of the corporation’s newfound authority
would be a matter of state law.
Thus, if the Court were to hold that for-proﬁt corporations or their
individual shareholders can object to the ACA mandate based on either
statutory or constitutional rights to free exercise of religion, federal and
state law principles would intertwine, ceding ultimate control over who may

59
60

eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Id. We do not attempt here an exhaustive survey of state law rules regarding the obligation to maximize proﬁts for shareholders, and we recognize the possibility that ﬁduciary constraints may vary in other jurisdictions. However, the general proposition that minority
shareholder interests cannot be subverted to serve noncorporate purposes does not require precise
elaboration. Also, to the extent state laws diﬀer, the lack of uniformity only emphasizes the
diﬃculty the Court would face were it to seek to deﬁne standing based upon state law rather than
prudential Article III analysis.
61 See, e.g., M ODEL B US . C ORP . A CT § 7.32 (2011) (authorizing shareholders in close corporations to substantially modify the rules of corporate governance subject only to public policy
limitations, but requiring that any such modiﬁcations be approved by all shareholders).
62 For example, if a store closes on Sundays it may lose signiﬁcant business, but an increase
in customer loyalty could lead to even greater long-term proﬁtability. Moreover, absent some
conﬂict of interest or serious defect in the decisionmaking process, the managers’ judgment would
be protected by the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 777, 781
(Ill. App. Ct. ����) (aﬃrming, under the business judgment rule, dismissal of derivative
shareholder lawsuit to compel “the installation of lights in Wrigley Field and the scheduling of
night baseball games”).
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litigate corporate free exercise claims to state lawmakers.63 Such entanglement is unavoidable because, even if couched as a matter of federal constitutional law, a holding that for-proﬁt corporations have free exercise rights
would immediately raise questions about how to determine the precise
content of a corporation’s religious beliefs. And, again, because corporations
are creatures of state law, these questions could be answered only by
reference to state corporate law.
Hobby Lobby is closely held and its shareholders apparently hold uniform religious beliefs.64 But easy cases make bad law.65 Given a more typical
corporation with shareholders of diverse religious beliefs, the method for
determining which of those beliefs the corporation can adopt as its own
would control the issue of free exercise. And, critically, states could adopt a
wide range of approaches. Some states would surely continue to require
shareholder unanimity, thereby restricting any right of free exercise to
closely held businesses; others might empower even public corporations to
declare religious beliefs through a charter amendment subject to a majority
shareholder vote. States might also establish a separate business entity form
to facilitate investment in a for-proﬁt business deﬁned by its religious
identity.66 In essence, the diﬃculty with recognizing corporate free exercise
rights, as the Tenth Circuit did in Hobby Lobby, is that state control over
corporate governance gives state lawmakers the power to determine whether
and how those rights may be enforced.
Notably, the Court’s previous foray into the First Amendment interests
of corporations provides little comfort. Although it has received its fair
share of critical commentary, Citizens United v. FEC,67 a recent case involving campaign ﬁnance limitations imposed upon corporations, has not been

63 The overlap of federal and state law is not, of course, unique to this area of corporate law.
For instance, federal securities law regulating the inclusion of shareholder proposals in corporate
proxy materials defers to state law regarding what matters are appropriate for shareholder action.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(1) (2013). In the context of free exercise, however, a lack of uniformity
would aﬀect a fundamental constitutional right.
64 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 7, at 20-21.
65 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 315 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“The familiar aphorism that hard cases make bad law should extend
to easy cases as well.”).
66 In recent years, a number of states have enacted new legislation to authorize the formation
of so-called “beneﬁt corporations,” in which managers are authorized to pursue stated goals other
than proﬁt maximization. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Beneﬁt Corporations: A Challenge in
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1008-10 (2013). It would be a relatively small step to include
religion in a list of authorized, alternative purposes or to create a new “R-Corp” entity choice.
67 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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vulnerable to circumvention at the state level68 because the Court’s holding
concerning the First Amendment right of free expression did not turn on
state-speciﬁc issues of corporate law. The Court’s holding in Citizens United
relied, in part, on the potential value of corporate speech for listeners in a
marketplace of ideas.69 From that perspective, corporate speech could have
value and thus merit protection regardless of whether corporations speak to
participate in a collective deliberation about truth, or to express moral
values, or more plausibly, whenever the cost of speaking is exceeded by the
expected proﬁts to be gained.70 Moreover, the corporation’s proﬁt-seeking
purposes could be advanced apart from any distinctive ethical values held
by individual shareholders.
To be sure, our concerns about the interplay of federal and state law
involve a fair bit of speculation. We do not know how the Court might rule
in the ﬁrst instance, and we do not purport to envision all possible responses
that inventive state legislatures might devise. For our purposes, it suﬃces to
observe that a wide range of outcomes is possible—and perhaps even
likely—at the state level, given the intense controversy surrounding the
religious issues at stake and the diﬃculty of addressing corporate standing
without relying upon state law deﬁnitions of the corporation.
Therefore, to avoid these concerns and to better conserve the Court’s
reputational capital, we respectfully submit that prudential third-party
standing provides the most successful solution to the general issue of
justiciability. Our recommended approach is grounded principally in federal
law and is based on prudential principles that rest upon constitutional law
considerations within the Court’s core area of expertise.
CONCLUSION
Unless the Court holds that the claims pursued by Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga Wood Specialties, and other similarly situated businesses are
68 To date, the Court has faced only one eﬀort by a state court to circumvent Citizens United.
In American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, the Court reversed a Montana Supreme Court
decision that held that the rationale of Citizens United did not apply in Montana. 132 S. Ct. 2490,
2491 (2012). The Bullock case underscores the desirability of basing any decision in Hobby Lobby
and other pending cases on federal justiciability law, and not state corporate law. Cf. Matthew I.
Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. R EV. 1257, 1264-65 (2011) (discussing the Founders’
concern with the “truly deplorable” mischiefs that would ensue from nonuniform application of
federal laws in diﬀerent states).
69 See 130 S. Ct. at 896; Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27
G A. S T. U. L. R EV. 1019, 1052-53 (2011).
70 Cf. C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 I ND . L.J. 981, 985-87
(2009) (arguing against the marketplace metaphor for speech protection and, concomitantly,
against corporate speech rights).
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nonjusticiable, thereby aﬃrming the substantive provisions of the mandate
by default, the Court faces an unpalatable choice: either inﬂate the ﬁction of
corporate personhood to include the most uniquely human of traits—the ability
to worship—or, no less problematic, ﬂatly disregard the distinct legal personhood of corporate litigants so that individual owners can challenge laws that do
not apply directly to them as infringements of their own religious liberty.
We have argued that these cases can be resolved more simply, and more
appropriately, under the existing doctrine of prudential third-party standing. Rather than attributing injury to individuals not subject to the mandate
or endowing a legal ﬁction with religious beliefs, third-party standing doctrine
permits corporate plaintiﬀs to challenge the mandate by asserting the constitutional interests of others—that is, the religious beliefs of their shareholders.71
Reliance upon third-party standing doctrine to resolve Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga Wood Specialties would be consistent with the Court’s usual
practice of proceeding cautiously and incrementally. Although other
litigants have invited it to do so, the Court has studiously avoided deﬁning
the full scope of corporate constitutional rights72—often by relying on the
concept of third-party standing.73 Even if there may come a time when the
Court must decide whether a for-proﬁt corporation can assert religious
objections to governmental regulation, it is not necessary to decide that
diﬃcult question on the facts presented here. As Chief Justice Roberts
wrote during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit, “if it is not necessary to decide
more, it is necessary not to decide more.”74

Preferred Citation: Matthew I. Hall & Benjamin Means, The Prudential ThirdParty Standing of Family-Owned Corporations, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 151
(2014), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-151.pdf.
71 Alternatively, one could take the position that the business owners’ choice to incorporate
for proﬁt precludes their religious objection to the ACA mandate. However, not only would this
approach rest upon malleable state law conceptions of the shareholder’s role, but it would also
require the Court to decide, as a matter of ﬁrst impression, whether a for-proﬁt corporation has an
independent free exercise right.
72 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (refusing to “address
the abstract question whether corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy
under the First Amendment” and resolving the case on narrower grounds); see also Garrett, supra
note 20, at 9-15.
73 Cf. W RIGHT ET AL ., supra note 27, at 712 (“The very diﬃculty of determining whether a
litigant has a personal right, whether derived from the rights of others or standing independently,
may justify direct reliance on the rights of others.”).
74 PDK Labs. Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).

